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Anti-Competition Regulation
Looking across the long twentieth century, this article tracks
the rise and fall of one form of anti-competition regulation:
the certiﬁcate of public convenience. Designed to curb
“destructive competition” in certain industries, such as trans-
portation and banking, certiﬁcate laws prevented ﬁrms from
entering those industries unless they could convince regulators
that they would satisfy an unmet public demand for goods or
services. This history highlights how lawmakers used similar
techniques in governing infrastructure and ﬁnance—two
ﬁelds that are not often studied together. It also shows that
state regulation both preﬁgured legal change at the federal
level and then lagged behind it, suggesting that different
dynamics have been in play at each level of governance in devis-
ing competition policy over the last century.
Keywords: competition, regulated industries, banking, ﬁnance,
small-sum lending, transportation, federalism, twentieth
century, United States
In 1938, as the United States struggled to emerge from the GreatDepression, lawyer Frank Brookes Hubachek stressed the importance
of state anti-competition regulation, designed to limit the extent of inter-
ﬁrm rivalry in the marketplace. Hubachek explained that “too intense”
competition did not serve the “public interest.”1 This lesson came from
experience with the small-sum lending industry, which offered loans of
three hundred dollars or less to households in need of quick cash. The
business had been regulated since the World War I era, when states
began adopting versions of a model lending law, known as the
The author thanks Laura Phillips Sawyer, Herbert Hovenkamp, and an anonymous
reviewer for Business History Review for their helpful suggestions that greatly improved
this piece.
1 Frank Brookes Hubachek and Russell Sage Foundation, Annotations on Small Loan
Laws: Based on the Sixth Draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law, Small Loan Series
(New York, 1938), 54.
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Uniform Small Loan Law, which allowed licensed lenders to charge up to
3.5 percent per month on declining loan balances. In exchange for the
ability to charge higher rates than those allowed under most state
usury laws, licensed lenders agreed to comply with state licensing
requirements and subject themselves to supervision by a state
administrator.2
The earliest versions of Uniform Law encouraged competition
between small-sum lenders by setting minimal barriers to entering the
business. Lenders that satisﬁed the law’s licensing requirements—
namely, submitting an application and posting a bond—could operate
so long as they abided by the rules specifying permissible loan terms.
The Uniform Law drafters sought to encourage “honest capital” to
enter the business, on the theory that “competition and the free ﬂow of
capital would produce the best results.”3
But, over time, the drafters determined that “competition and
natural forces alone would not bring about a distribution of capital in
which the supply closely approximated the demand.”4 In other words,
too much competition encouraged too much lending. Rather than
driving down rates of charge, “competitive pressure” had encouraged
licensed lenders to engage in “overlending, lending for improvident pur-
poses, excessive and unwise advertising, unjustiﬁed and too frequent
renewals, ofﬁces in towns too small to require them, harsh collection
methods, scalping of fees and small overcharges of various kinds.”5
Hubachek observed that competition had fostered these “unsound prac-
tices” between the birth of the business and the onset of the Great
Depression.6
Hence, in 1932, Hubachek helped pioneer new licensing rules that
limited the free entry of small-sum lenders into the marketplace.
Under these rules, which appeared in the ﬁfth version of the Uniform
Law, state small-sum lending regulators could not issue a new license
to a lender without ﬁrst ﬁnding that allowing the lender “to engage in
business will promote the convenience and advantage of the community
2 The Uniform Law covered only nondepository institutions licensed under the law. It did
not cover pawnbrokers, commercial or savings banks, or industrial or Morris Plan banks.
3Hubachek and Russell Sage Foundation, Annotations on Small Loan Laws, 53.
4Hubachek and Russell Sage Foundation, 53–54.
5 Frank Brookes Hubachek, “Increased Regulation of Personal Finance” (paper, American
Association of Personal Finance Companies 19th Annual Convention, Columbia Libraries,
Sept. 1933), 58–59; Hubachek, “The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws,” Law
and Contemporary Problems 8 (1941): 121.
6Hubachek, “Increased Regulation,” 57.
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in which the business of the applicant is to be conducted.”7 New York
State had already adopted a similar requirement in 1914.8
Hubachek prevailed in convincing some lenders and many lawmak-
ers to support the new version of the Uniform Law. Speaking before the
lenders’ trade association, Hubachek urged the industry to back the law
reform effort rather than wait for lawmakers to impose their own con-
straints on the business. Failure to address the “evils” of overcompeti-
tion, he advised, “is to draw the razor over your own throats—or invite
the governments to do so.”9 New Jersey was the ﬁrst state to adopt the
convenience and advantage requirement in 1932, followed by
New York later that year.10
Much has been written about the history of antitrust and other laws
devoted to the preservation and encouragement of interﬁrm competi-
tion.11 Historians have likewise explored efforts by private business
and administrative agencies to control and manage competition,
through measures such as price ﬁxing, from the World War I era
through the New Deal.12 In addition, they have considered the competi-
tive effects of laws designed to ensure that certain businesses meet
minimum safety and quality standards, such as licensing and inspection
requirements.13 They have also situated these legal developments
within the development of economic ideas about markets and their
governance.14
7David Jacque Gallert, Walter SternHilborn, and GeoffreyMay, Small Loan Legislation: A
History of the Regulation of the Business of Lending Small Sums (New York, 1932), 234.
8New York Laws of 1914, chap. 369.
9Hubachek, “Increased Regulation,” 59.
10Hubachek, “Regulatory Small Loan Laws,” 122. By 1969, thirty-three states had this
requirement. Robert P. Shay, “Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist’s View,”
Cornell Law Review 54 (1969): 512.
11 See, for example, Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and
America, 1880–1990 (Cambridge, U.K., 1992).
12 See, for example, Laura Phillips Sawyer, American Fair Trade: Proprietary Capitalism,
Corporatism, and the “New Competition,” 1890–1940 (Cambridge, U.K., 2018); Gerald Berk,
Louis D. Brandeis and the Making of Regulated Competition, 1900–1932, 1st ed. (Cambridge,
U.K., 2009); andWilliamBoyd, “Just Price, Public Utility, and theLongHistory of EconomicReg-
ulation in America,” Yale Journal on Regulation 35 (2018): 721–78. On efforts by railroads to
prevent “ruinous” competition even earlier, in the 1870s, see Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA, 1977), 133-144.
13 For example, Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of
American History, 1900–1916 (New York, 1963), 98–108 (meat inspection); Marc T. Law
and Sukkoo Kim, “Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence
of Occupational Licensing Regulation,” Journal of Economic History 65, no. 3 (2005): 723–56
(occupational licensing); and Richard Sylla, “Federal Policy, Banking Market Structure, and
Capital Mobilization in the United States, 1863–1913,” Journal of Economic History 29, no.
4 (1969): 657–86 (bank capital requirements).
14 See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836–1937
(Cambridge, MA, 1991); and Hovenkamp, “United States Competition Policy in Crisis:
1890–1955,” Minnesota Law Review 94 (2009): 311–67.
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Less attention has been given to explicitly anti-competitive regula-
tions limiting the entry and expansion of competing ﬁrms in industries
ranging from railroads to small-sum lending across the twentieth
century.15 This article presents the history of one such regulatory tool:
the certiﬁcate of public convenience. Unlike licensing rules, which
purport to ensure that ﬁrms provide a minimum quality of service but
may have unadvertised anti-competitive effects, certiﬁcate requirements
have served no stated purpose other than limiting competition.16 The
history of certiﬁcates therefore offers a direct way to trace prevailing
legal practices and ideas about the desirability of competition within
certain industries, while disentangling these concerns from those
related to ensuring quality standards.
This article tracks the certiﬁcate’s appearance and later disappear-
ance at the state and federal levels across several industries. It ﬁrst
documents the state-level origins of the certiﬁcate, which spread from
railroad regulation into other industries, including small-sum lending,
between the 1880s and the New Deal.17 It then pivots to the federal
level, to show how policymakers followed the example of the states by
incorporating certiﬁcate requirements into federal law, beginning in
the 1920s. The article also considers the legality of certiﬁcate laws, and
why they largely survived legal challenges, before examining the move-
ment to rollback certiﬁcate laws that ﬁrst took hold at the federal level
in the late 1970s. As the ﬁnal section shows, the states also reconsidered
their anti-competition laws in the 1980s, but certiﬁcate requirements
lingered for much longer in the states and remain on the books in
many jurisdictions today.
This history yields twomajor insights. First, it shows how lawmakers
used similar techniques in regulating competition in infrastructure and
in ﬁnance—two arenas of regulatory policy that are not often studied
together.18 In both arenas, lawmakers deployed certiﬁcates to ensure
15Work on particular industries discusses entry restrictions as part of the overall regulatory
scheme for that market: e.g., Mark H. Rose, Bruce E. Seely, and Paul F. Barrett, The Best
Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines, and American Public
Policy in the Twentieth Century (Columbus, OH, 2006). On present certiﬁcate developments,
see Timothy Sandefur, “State Competitor’s Veto Laws and the Right to Earn a Living: Some
Paths to Federal Reform,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 38 (2015): 1009–72.
16On occupational licensing, see, among others, Morris M. Kleiner, Licensing Occupa-
tions: Ensuring Quality Or Restricting Competition? (Kalamazoo, MI, 2006).
17 Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, “The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law,” Columbia Law Review 98 (1998): 1359n161 (noting that certiﬁcates for reg-
ulated industries began in the states); William K. Jones, “Origins of the Certiﬁcate of Public
Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870–1920,” Columbia Law
Review 79 (1979): 426–516.
18Morgan Ricks, “Money as Infrastructure,” Columbia Business Law Review 2018, no. 3
(2018): 767 (noting the “kinship” between bank regulation and “infrastructure” regulation
that is “seldom recognized in the regulatory literature”).
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that the total supply of goods and services produced in a community did
not exceed the public demand, thereby discouraging unsound competi-
tive practices that could lead to business failures. Second, it also shows
that state regulation preﬁgured legal change at the federal level and
then lagged behind it, suggesting that different forces have been at
work at each level of governance in devising competition policy over
the last century.19
The Beginning of “Public Convenience and Necessity” in the States
By the time New Jersey adopted a “convenience and advantage
requirement” for licensing small-sum lenders in 1932, existing state
laws already subjected other businesses to similar entry restrictions.
The move toward anti-competition regulation began with the railroads
in 1882, when Massachusetts amended its law to mandate that the
state administrators not issue a license for a new railroad or expansion
of an existing road unless they found that “public convenience and neces-
sity” required its construction.20 The state adopted this provision at the
urging of its Board of Railroad Commissioners, a state administrative
agency that reviewed applications for new roads. “The history of railroad
enterprises shows that needless and useless roads have been constructed
from spite, from a desire to control or annoy other railroad companies,
and still more frequently from a spirit of mad speculation,” the board
observed in 1881.21 It later noted that, without the board’s review of
new railroad construction plans, unnecessary railroads could be built
and then fail before the builders could pay off investors, creditors, and
the landowners whose property was seized for the road through
eminent domain.22
Thereafter, New York railroad administrators sought a similar rule
for their state, noting that “excessive” construction of roads led to rate-
cutting wars between rival railroads, insufﬁcient revenue for roads to
engage in basic maintenance and safety precautions, and ultimately
“leases, consolidation, or ‘pools,’ designed to secure from the people . . .
an ample return upon the entire capital thus in part unnecessarily
expended.”23 In the administrators’ view, state control of railroad rates
imposed a “corresponding obligation” on the state “to protect existing
19On policymaking at the state level see, for example, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “Who
Passes Business’s ‘Model Bills’? Policy Capacity and Corporate Inﬂuence in U.S. State Politics,”
Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 582–602.
20 Jones, “Origins,” 435–36.
21 Jones, 435 (quoting 12 Mass. Bd. of R.R. Comm’rs Ann. Rep. 57 [1881]).
22 Jones, 436 (quoting 15 Mass. Bd. of R.R. Comm’rs Ann. Rep. 30 [1884]).
23 Jones, 438 (citing 1 N.Y. Bd. of R.R. Comm’rs Ann. Rep. 64 [1884]).
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railroads from useless and disastrous competition by unnecessary new
[roads].”24 Although some competition could yield “public beneﬁts,” it
“ought not to be permitted to become ruinous, destructive, and demoral-
izing.”25 The New York legislature granted the administrators’ request for
this review power in 1892.26
Thereafter, state legislators and industrial reformers embraced the
use of entry restrictions in utility regulation more broadly. The National
Civic Federation, a coalition of labor and business reformers that sup-
ported large-scale industrial combinations, drafted a model bill in 1914
for public-utility regulation that included a “public convenience and
necessity” licensing requirement.27 In support of its approach, the feder-
ation observed that administrative regulation was “inconsistent” with
unfettered competition.28 State court judges likewise concluded that
entry restrictions were justiﬁed as a means to control the cost of provid-
ing services to the public. “It is for the beneﬁt of the public that the
highest efﬁciency be obtained from a public utility and that it serve the
public at the lowest cost,” wrote the Utah Supreme Court. It concluded
that “such an end cannot be reached if the community is served by dupli-
cate plants.”29 Academics similarly understood the certiﬁcate require-
ment as a means to “to prevent unnecessary duplication of utility
properties through the introduction of competition where the public
welfare demands the recognition of monopoly.”30
Although some public-utility providers initially opposed state regu-
latory efforts, as in New York State, the industry generally came to
support state commission regulation as an alternative to the uncertainty
of local and municipal control.31 The movement for state legislation
crested between 1905 and 1920, when thirty-two states limited the
entry and expansion of public-utility providers—such as telephone, elec-
tric, and gas suppliers—based on whether state administrators found
that a new licensee would serve the “public convenience and necessity.”32
24 Jones, 438.
25 “The Railroad Commissioners’ Report,” New York Times, 14 Jan. 1885 (quoting 1885
New York Commissioners report).
26 Jones, “Origins,” 439, 445–46.
27 Jones, 452.
28 Jones, 452–53.
29 Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 141 P. 1083, 1090 (1914). See also Weld v. Gas &
Elec. Light Comm’rs, 84 N.E. 101, 102–3 (1908).
30 I. Leo Sharfman, “Commission Regulation of Public Utilities: A Survey of Legislation,”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 53 (1914): 11.
31 Gregg A. Jarrell, “The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry,”
Journal of Law & Economics 21, no. 2 (1978): 293–94; Jones, “Origins,” 453. On New York
State, see Robert F. Wesser, Charles Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York,
1905–1910 (Ithaca, 1967), 158–59.
32 Jones, “Origins,” 454–55; Ford Poulton Hall, “Certiﬁcates of Convenience and Neces-
sity,” Michigan Law Review 28 (1929): 121n78.
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States imposed similar restrictions on bus lines operators and other
“common carriers” beginning in 1913.33 By 1947, forty-seven out of
forty-eight states required some common carriers and public utilities
to obtain a certiﬁcate of convenience and necessity.34
Although not considered to be public utilities, ﬁnancial institutions
also became subject to state “convenience and advantage” restrictions on
their creation and expansion beginning in the early twentieth century,
after a spate of bank failures. New York State began restricting the
opening of new banks and existing bank branches in 1908, following
the failure of several banks during the panic of 1907.35 The change was
recommended by a commission of bankers, who were appointed by the
governor after the panic to propose legal reforms to avert future bank
failures, and was endorsed by both the state banking superintendent
and the governor.36 The legislature amended the state banking law
accordingly. Thereafter, the state banking administrator could not
approve a new bank charter without ﬁrst ﬁnding that it would promote
the “public convenience and advantage.”37
Other states imitated New York. Massachusetts imposed a similar
restriction for savings banks later that same year.38 Shortly thereafter,
in 1909, California likewise adopted a “public convenience and advan-
tage” branch-approval requirement based on New York’s model.39 In
1911, Kansas similarly granted its banking board the power to deny a
bank charter application if “public necessity” did not support the
bank’s creation. Later that same year, the Kansas board explained the
purpose of public-necessity review, in a decision denying a bank
charter. “The establishment of additional banks in a town where the
business is not such as to demand or justify the establishment of such
banks has a tendency to weaken and make unsafe all of the banks in
said town,” the board noted. “The division of the business is such that
it is difﬁcult for the banks to obtain the amount of deposits necessary
in order to earn a return sufﬁcient to pay expenses and a dividend on
the capital, and creates a temptation to pay high and unsafe rates of
33 Jones, “Origins,” 485.
34 Ford Poulton Hall, State Control of Business through Certiﬁcates of Convenience and
Necessity (Bloomington, IN, 1947), 21–25.
35 Shirley Donald Southworth, Branch Banking in the United States (New York, 1928), 131;
Edwin Stokes, “Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications for New Banks and
Branches,” Banking Law Journal 74 (Dec. 1957): 922–23. The state already restricted the
entry of new savings banks and trust companies. Stokes, 923n7.
36Wesser, Charles Evans Hughes, 186–87; “The Bank Commission Report,” New York
Times, 30 Dec. 1907, 6; “State Banking Committee Report Suggests Many Changes,” Wall
Street Journal, 18 Dec. 1907, 8.
37 Southworth, Branch Banking, 131; New York Laws of 1908, chap. 125
38 Stokes, “Public Convenience,” 923n7.
39 Southworth, Branch Banking, 36–38.
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interest on the deposits, and further makes it difﬁcult for banks to loan
their money to safe borrowers, and creates a tendency to lend money to
unsafe borrowers, the result of all of which is to cause unsafe banking.”40
To encourage safe banking, the state charged the board with preventing
new banks from entering communities that already had sufﬁcient
banking facilities.
More states followed suit a couple of decades later, in reaction to the
bank failures of the Great Depression.41 As economist Robert P. Shay
later observed, legislative reformers in the 1930s commonly blamed
“competitive excesses in the 1920’s as a cause for difﬁculties experienced
by ﬁnancial institutions during the Great Depression.”42 All states even-
tually imposed some version of a convenience and advantage require-
ment for new bank charters, as well as for bank branches in states that
allowed branching.43 States also incorporated this requirement into
their licensing rules for small-sum lenders beginning in 1932, at the
urging of attorney Frank Brookes Hubachek.44
But most certiﬁcate laws did not tell state administrators how to
determine what would “promote the convenience and advantage of the
community,” leaving bureaucrats to develop their own standards.45
For example, the New Jersey state small loans administrator, James
M. Sullivan, developed the “Sullivan formula” to assess new small-sum
lending license applications.46 Sullivan ﬁrst used U.S. census data to cal-
culate the total number of potential borrower households in the state and
then looked to state-level borrowing statistics to determine how many
potential borrowers actually used small loans.47 He then determined
whether any unmet need for credit existed in the community where
the licensee planned to locate, based on an assessment of the need for
small loans within the community and a survey of the existing lenders
located there. The administrator would refuse to grant a new license in
any area where he found that existing loan ofﬁces already met the
40 Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83–84 (Kan. 1911).
41 John W. Transelle, “The Efﬁciency of Liberalizing Branch Banking in Indiana,” Indiana
Law Review 13 (1980): 800–1.
42 Shay, “Uniform Consumer Credit Code,” 512.
43 Stokes, “Public Convenience,” 921; “Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and
Merger Laws: Competition Frustrated Notes and Comments,” Yale Law Journal 71, no. 3
(1962): 510–11.
44Hubachek, “Regulatory Small Loan Laws,” 122.
45 This was true at the federal level as well, e.g., I.C.C. v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945).
46Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, 90 A.2d 85, 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952);
James A. Sullivan, “A Statement on the Convenience and Advantage Clause: The Method of
Application Used and the Policy Applied in New Jersey,” n.d., folder 190: Consumer Credit
Studies, 1944–1951, box 24, Russell Sage Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center,
Sleepy Hollow, NY.
47 Sullivan, “Statement on Convenience and Advantage.”
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community’s need for credit.48 State banking regulators applied simi-
larly detailed calculations to determine whether to grant new branch
or bank applications.49
As these administrative procedures show, certiﬁcate restrictions
were different in kind from licensing rules and other regulations not
expressly designed to cap the number of ﬁrms operating in a given
region. “Under the typical licensing statute any number of applicants
may receive authorizations if each of them satisﬁes applicable licensing
criteria,” one scholar observed. “The test is essentially qualitative.” But
certiﬁcate requirements included a “quantitative dimension.” They
resulted in the “exclusion of otherwise qualiﬁed applicants from a
market because, in the judgment of the regulatory commission, the addi-
tion of new or expanded services would have no beneﬁcial consequences
or, in a more extreme case, would actually have harmful conse-
quences.”50 The law did not distinguish between big and small busi-
nesses, nor seek to shelter small enterprises from ﬁrms with large
market power. Indeed, it favored the growth of existing ﬁrms into
bigger businesses, by empowering administrators to block the entry of
a new ﬁrm if an existing company already adequately served the
market or had the potential to do so.51
Across industries, courts and state administrators cited a common
purpose for these rules: to beneﬁt the public by eliminating “wasteful
competition.”52 For infrastructure, the harmful consequences of compe-
tition included “wasteful duplication” of facilities, “ruinous competition”
between providers, “cream skimming” of the most proﬁtable customers
by new operators that diminished the quality of service given to less-
proﬁtable customers by existing providers, discouragement of future
investment in the regulated industry, and various negative “externali-
ties” such as environmental harms.53 For “motor carriers,” for
example, entry restrictions prevented the public streets from being over-
crowded and worn down by “over-use.” They also curbed “cut-throat
competition” between motor carriers that might discourage these
48 See, for instance, Family Finance Corp. v. Gough, 76 A.2d 82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1950).
49 Stokes, “Public Convenience,” 929.
50 Jones, “Origins,” 427.
51 See, for example, Egyptian Transp. Sys. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 152 N.E. 510, 513 (Ill.
1926) (setting aside state commerce commission’s grant of certiﬁcate to a new bus line to
provide service on the grounds that the two existing railroads that served the same route
must be given “the ﬁrst right to furnish” the proposed service); and Sohngen v. Pub. Utilities
Comm’n of Ohio, 154 N.E. 734, 735 (Ohio 1926) (afﬁrming state public utility commission’s
grant of a certiﬁcate to an existing bus line to extend its service and simultaneous denial of cer-
tiﬁcate to new entrants to serve the same route).
52Hall, State Control of Business, 10.
53 Jones, “Origins,” 501; Hall, “Certiﬁcates of Convenience and Necessity,” 108–9.
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carriers from serving less-proﬁtable routes and cause some to go out of
business, thereby thwarting the goal of serving the public’s “need for efﬁ-
cient permanent service.”54 Likewise, for ﬁnancial services, competition
could lead to overproduction and excessive risk-taking that might, in the
case of deposit-taking institutions, imperil the overall safety of the
banking system or, in the case of small-sum lenders, subject consumers
to predatory practices.
Economic thinking further bolstered the case for certiﬁcates. In
1894, economist Richard T. Ely deemed some industries to be natural
monopolies: namely, “railways, telegraphs, telephones, canals, irrigation
works, harbors, gasworks, street-car lines, and the like.”55 Natural
monopolies generally supplied a necessary good, occupied valuable
land, and could increase the available supply of goods and services
without increasing marginal costs.56 In these businesses, Ely declared,
there could be no competition and “all appearances which resemble
competition are simply temporary and illusory” stages preceding
combination.57
Economists did not claim, however, that banks or licensed lenders
were natural monopolies. Rather, their arguments for limiting competi-
tion in these markets rested solely on concerns about consumer welfare.
Economist Clyde Olin Fisher observed that if the goal of small-sum
lending regulation was to protect the “worthy borrower,” then “it is difﬁ-
cult to see wherein it becomes necessary to grant a license to every group
which wishes to invade the small loan ﬁeld in the hope of picking up a few
dollars”—especially when “duplicationmakes necessary a higher interest
charge.”58 Fisher also drew parallels between the consumer lending and
transportation industries in explaining why limits on competition served
the public interest in obtaining lower-cost services. Competition among
consumer lenders would not “lower rates,” just as “the duplication of
railroad lines where one road can handle all the trafﬁc” would not
yield “reduced railroad rates.”He explained that “the duplication of com-
panies under a ‘laissez-faire’ policy must cause higher overhead and
hence a higher interest charge.”59
54David E. Lilienthal and Irwin S. Rosenbaum, “Motor Carrier Regulation by Certiﬁcates of
Necessity and Convenience,” Yale Law Journal 36, no. 2 (1926): 164–66.
55 Richard T. Ely, “Natural Monopolies and the Workingman: A Programme of Social
Reform,” North American Review 158, no. 448 (1894): 294.
56Richard T. Ely, “The Telegraph Monopoly,” North American Review 149, no. 392
(1889): 45.
57 Ely, “Natural Monopolies,” 294.
58 Clyde Olin Fisher, “The Small Loans Problem: Connecticut Experience,” American Eco-
nomic Review 19, no. 2 (1929): 191.
59 Clyde Olin Fisher, “Reply on Small Loans Problem,” American Economic Review 19, no.
4 (1929): 645.
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Of course, certiﬁcate laws also beneﬁted incumbent businesses by
blunting the threat of competition by new entrants to the industry. But
interest group pressure alone cannot account for the spread of these
laws at the state level. Indeed, among small-sum lenders, the value of
such laws to existing operators was not self-evident in the 1930s.
Hubachek had to make the case for law reform to the industry and his
pitch focused on how certiﬁcate laws could forestall more onerous
state intervention in the marketplace, not on the beneﬁts to incumbents.
Interest group inﬂuence alone does not explain the spread of certiﬁcates.
Rather, the popularity of certiﬁcate laws also reﬂected then-prevailing
concerns about the harm that competition could inﬂict on the public.
Thus, economic thinking and the interests of industry incumbents
both pushed in the same direction in the early twentieth century—
toward constraints on competition in the markets for ﬁnancial services
and infrastructure.
The Migration to the Federal Level
Certiﬁcate requirements migrated into federal laws governing public
utilities and ﬁnancial institutions in the 1930s. It is not surprising that
these ideas ﬁrst took root in the states, given the delayed emergence of
the federal administrative state relative to its state and local counter-
parts. To be sure, a federal administrative state existed prior to the
New Deal. Much of the regulatory action remained at the state level,
however, until the Great Depression catalyzed the expansion of a
national bureaucracy to manage an economy where commerce increas-
ingly moved across state and local borders. The federal adoption of cer-
tiﬁcates began in 1920, when Congress required railroads to obtain a
certiﬁcate of convenience and necessity in order to construct new lines
or expand existing lines. The provision received no congressional
debate, perhaps because lawmakers were already familiar with state
certiﬁcate laws and saw little reason not to import the same standard
into federal railroad regulation.60
The spread of entry restrictions then accelerated during the New
Deal, when economic thinking on competition aligned closely with the
self-interest of industry. By 1932, amid the Great Depression, a rising
chorus of businessmen called for the federal government to intervene
against the destructive forces of “excessive competition.” As historian
60Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456; James C. Roberton, “Adminis-
trative Regulation by Conditions in Certiﬁcates of Public Convenience and Necessity Recent
Development,” Stanford Law Review 21, no. 1 (1968): 192. Roberton notes that Congress
ignored the certiﬁcate provision and instead debated other aspects of this legislation when
deliberating on the bill (p. 192).
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Ellis Hawley recounts, trade association leaders, economists, and former
government ofﬁcials likewise praised proposals for regulating produc-
tion, prices, and entry.61 One proposal by the head of a “management
engineering” ﬁrm sought to require the issuance of certiﬁcates of conve-
nience and advantage to those entering an industry already “possessed of
excess capacity,” to prevent Americans from continuing to be “cruciﬁed
on the cross of competition.”62
The National Industrial Recovery Act represented the most intense,
albeit short-lived, federal effort to control competition. Enacted in 1933,
the law required the creation of codes of “fair competition” that would
govern maximumworking hours, minimumwages, and other conditions
of employment in each industry. Although the law did not mention
certiﬁcates of convenience, several industries included a certiﬁcate
requirement in their codes of fair competition.63 The National Recovery
Administration was disbanded in short order, however, after the
Supreme Court declared the code system unconstitutional in 1935.64
But Congress explicitly imposed certiﬁcate requirements for utility
providers as part of several New Deal legislative measures, which
followed the model of the 1920 federal railroad certiﬁcate regime. The
Communications Act of 1934 required communications carriers, such
as telephone companies, to receive a “certiﬁcate of public convenience
and necessity” from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
before constructing new lines or extending existing lines.65 Likewise,
the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 required common carriers
engaged in interstate transportation of people or goods to receive a
certiﬁcate of public convenience and necessity from the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.66 In 1938, Congress vested the authority to grant
certiﬁcates of convenience for domestic airline carriers in the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority, later renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).67 It
also applied similar rules to interstate natural gas providers.68
As with the 1920 railroad certiﬁcate requirement, Congress did not
debate these provisions, which one commentator described as “neglected
fragments of much larger legislative undertakings.”69 The Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) did, however, explain why it endorsed
61 Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton, 1966), 41.
62Hawley, 40–41. Charles R. Stevenson, The Way Out (New York, 1932), 26–27.
63Hall, State Control of Business, 9.
64 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
65 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064.
66 John J. George, “Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935,” Cornell Law Quarterly 21, no. 2
(1936): 235–36.
67 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.
68Natural Gas Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821.
69Roberton, “Administrative Regulation,” 192–93.
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entry restrictions and included a certiﬁcate provision in an early draft of
what became the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. In 1928, as part of an inves-
tigation into the regulation of motor carriers, the ICC observed that a
majority of states required operators of common-carrier motor vehicles
to obtain certiﬁcates, which protected “the public interest” by “excluding
unnecessary and wasteful competition” and preventing “duplication and
unnecessary service where existing facilities are sufﬁcient.”70 Six years
later, the ICC noted that “free-for-all competition has never worked
successfully” and warned that “unless competition is brought under
greater restraint, it can bring only wide-spread losses to shippers, to
communities and sections of the country, to investors in rail, water,
andmotor facilities, and to the public generally.”71 It predicted that a cer-
tiﬁcate requirement would help bring order to the motor carrier indus-
try, in part by increasing the average size of each carrier operation and
decreasing the total number of operators in existence.72 Thus, rather
than try to prevent industry consolidation, the ICC advocated for certif-
icates as a means to encourage it.
Financial regulation at the federal level followed a similar course
during the Great Depression.73 In 1933, Congress imposed limits on
banks’ payments of interest to depositors in order to lessen “the pres-
sures of rate competition for deposit funds,” which pushed banks to
“reach for riskier, higher-yielding loans and investments.”74 Congress
then amended the Federal Reserve Act in 1935 to require the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency to consider the “convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served” before approving a new national bank charter.75
It also created the same screening requirement for admission of new
state banks to the Federal Reserve System and for coverage of nonmem-
ber state banks by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).76
In explaining the need to limit entry of new banks, the FDIC chairman
observed that “many localities” generated a sufﬁcient volume of deposits
to support “only one or two banks” and that the entry of additional banks
70Motor Bus andMotor Truck Operation, 140 I.C.C. 685, 746 (1928); George M. Chandler,
“Convenience and Necessity: Motor Carrier Licensing by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion,” Ohio State Law Journal, no. 3 (1967): 380.
71Regulation of Transportation Agencies, Second Report of the Federal Coordinator of
Transportation, S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 24 (1934).
72Regulation of Transportation Agencies, 28, 30.
73Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenﬁeld, and Robert S. Stillman, “The Regulation of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies,” Virginia Law Review 73 (1987): 302.
74 Shay, “Uniform Consumer Credit Code,” 513.
75 Stokes, “Public Convenience,” 926; Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684;
David A. Alhadeff, “A Reconsideration of Restrictions on Bank Entry,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 76, no. 2 (1962): 249.
76 Sam Peltzman, “Entry in Commercial Banking,” Journal of Law & Economics 8 (1965):
12. See also Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133.
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would lead to “speculative and destructive practices.”77 The FDIC sup-
ported entry restrictions as a means to avoid a “return to the overbanked
condition of 1920” and the “growth of excessive banking facilities” that
had led to bank failures.78
Some small-sum lenders smiled knowingly while witnessing the
beginnings of these shifts at the federal level. They proudly observed
that their business had anticipated the “social viewpoint of the New
Deal” and incorporated it into their governing law. In 1933, one lender
encouraged “the business man” to “turn to personal ﬁnance for a clarify-
ing illustration of how the principles of the New Deal can work in prac-
tice.”79 Before an assembly of small-sum lenders, he noted that “personal
ﬁnance” had already “anticipated the general aims and methods of
planned economy,” while also urging his colleagues to “go still further
along the path indicated” by measures such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act.80 And, for the business to really align itself “with the
spirit of the times,” he counseled, it should “embrace more wholeheart-
edly the idea of the certiﬁcate of convenience and advantage” that the
Uniform Law had introduced in 1932.81
Legal Authority to Curtail Competition
Just as state-level certiﬁcate laws anticipated federal regulatory
developments, legal challenges to state-level certiﬁcate laws likewise pre-
ceded their expansion at the federal level. Between 1905 and 1937, courts
struck down a variety of economic regulations for infringing on individ-
ual liberty of contract, which was protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The period came to be known as the
Lochner era, after a U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating a state
law that limited bakers’ working hours on due process grounds.82
Courts regularly reviewed legislation to determine if it represented a
proper exercise of state police powers or unconstitutional overreaching.
The U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to review the legality of state cer-
tiﬁcate requirements in 1932, just as state and federal legislators were
considering applying such rules to additional industries in response to
the economic collapse of the Depression.
77 Banking Act of 1935, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 32 (1935) (statement of Leo T. Crowley, chairman
of the board, FDIC).
78 Banking Act of 1935, Hearing at 31.
79M. R. Neifeld, “Economic Aspects of Personal Finance” (paper, American Association of
Personal Finance Companies 19th Annual Convention, Columbia Libraries, Sept. 1933), 34.
80Neifeld, 34.
81Neifeld, 34.
82 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The question of whether certiﬁcate restrictions ran afoul of the due
process clause ﬁrst came before the Court in 1932, in the case of New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, which concerned the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma certiﬁcate requirement for businesses engaged in the sale,
manufacture, or distribution of ice.83 Under the law, the state adminis-
trator could not issue an operating license “except upon proof of the
necessity for a supply of ice at the place” where the licensee “sought to
establish the business” and could deny an application if the existing
licensees provided sufﬁcient ice facilities “to meet the public needs” of
the community.84 As the Court explained, the purpose of the law was
“not to encourage competition, but to prevent it; not to regulate the busi-
ness, but to preclude persons from engaging in it.”85
The resulting decision in New State Ice shows how the nature of the
industry determined the extent of permissible state control under the
jurisprudence of the Lochner era. A majority of the Court struck down
the Oklahoma ice law based on the “character” of the ice business.
Justice Sutherland, for the majority, explained that the Oklahoma law
might be permissible if applied to a business of a certain character,
such as a natural monopoly or “an enterprise in its nature dependent
upon the grant of public privileges.” But the law was not permissible
when applied to businesses engaged in “ordinary manufacture and
production.”86
This approach tracked the Court’s due process decisions from the
late nineteenth century through the early 1930s. Under these cases, a
business could fall within one of three categories: public utilities, those
“affected with the public interest,” and private enterprises. Public utili-
ties were subject to the greatest state control, while private enterprises
stood at the other end of the spectrum. As early twentieth-century
legal scholars explained, “public service corporations” or “public utili-
ties” were outliers, encompassing “those few businesses where the con-
ditions are monopolistic” and the business held itself out as offering
an essential or necessary service to the general public.87 A business
83New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See also Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925) (Commerce Clause challenge); and Frost v. Corp. Commission of Okla., 278
U.S. 515 (1929) (equal protection challenge).
84New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 272.
85New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 279.
86New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 279.
87 Bruce Wyman, The Special Law Governing Public Service Corporations, and All Others
Engaged in Public Employment (New York, 1911), viii; Thomas P. Hardman, “Public Utilities:
I. The Quest for a Concept,”West Virginia Law Quarterly & The Bar 37 (1930): 251 (summa-
rizing Wyman’s deﬁnition). But, for a list of all of the businesses that fell within the public
utility category, seeWilliam J. Novak, “The Public Utility Idea and the Origins ofModern Busi-
ness Regulation,” in Corporations and American Democracy, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and
William J. Novak (Cambridge, MA, 2017), 139–76.
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“affected with the public interest” rested in the middle zone; it could be
subject to greater state oversight than a private enterprise but did not
have the same universal service obligations or regulatory burdens as
common carriers and other public utilities.88 (Small-sum lenders, for
example, accepted that their business was “affected with the public inter-
est” but vigorously rejected any suggestion that they were utilities.)89
Finally, there were run-of-the-mill commercial businesses, such as ice
making, which were not subject to the heightened forms of economic reg-
ulation that might be applied to enterprises in the other two categories.
Although the Supreme Court struck down the certiﬁcate law in New
State Ice, the decision also afﬁrmed the constitutionality of certiﬁcate
laws when applied to regulate public utilities or businesses “affected
with the public interest.” And courts generally upheld the constitutional-
ity of certiﬁcate restrictions so long as they were applied to such
businesses.90
The constitutionality of certiﬁcate laws then became even easier to
establish after the Supreme Court revised its approach to due process
claims in 1934. That year, in Nebbia v. New York, the Court abandoned
the effort to deﬁne which businesses were “affected with the public inter-
est.”91 And shortly thereafter, in 1937, the Court announced it would no
longer subject economic regulations to any form of heightened scrutiny,
regardless of the nature of the industry. Constitutional due process
required only that an economic regulation be “reasonable in relation to
its subject” and “adopted in the interests of the community,” the Court
proclaimed.92 Legislators merely had to show that a rational basis
existed for the rules that they adopted.93
Thus, by the 1950s, when certiﬁcate rules for small-sum lenders
came before state courts, judges easily dismissed due process challenges
to their constitutionality.94 In one New Jersey case, the objecting appli-
cants argued that the convenience and advantage requirement of the
88Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of State of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522,
543 (1923). On the effort to deﬁne “affected with the public interest,” see Samuel R. Olken,
“The Decline of Legal Classicism and the Evolution of New Deal Constitutionalism,” Notre
Dame Law Review 89 (2014): 2057–60; Malcolm Rutherford, “The Judicial Control of Busi-
ness: Walton Hamilton, Antitrust, and Chicago,” Seattle University Law Review 34 (2011):
1391; and Herbert Hovenkamp, “The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process,” Stanford
Law Review 40 (1988): 442.
89Anne Fleming,City of Debtors: A Century of Fringe Finance (Cambridge,MA, 2018), 73.
90Hall, “Certiﬁcates of Convenience and Necessity,” 111.
91Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
92W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
93United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
94Gough, 76 A.2d at 87; Family Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, 95 A.2d 407, 409 (1953). See also
Equitable Loan Soc. v. Bell, 14 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1940); and Kelleher v. Minshull, 119 P.2d 302
(Wash. 1941).
Anne Fleming / 716
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680519001223
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Georgetown University Library, on 22 Jan 2020 at 23:41:49, subject to the Cambridge Core
state small loan law violated the “fundamental common right to engage
in a lawful pursuit,” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.95 The
New Jersey judiciary rejected this claim. It found that the small-sum
lending industry was “clothed with a public interest” and was therefore
“subject to regulation.”96 Moreover, the court concluded, the entry
restriction had “a direct and immediate connection with the public
interest.”97
In the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court even went so far as to repri-
mand the FCC for neglecting to follow congressional intent to curtail
competition in certain industries. The Court addressed the parameters
of federal competition policy in the case of FCC v. RCA (1953), which
arose after the FCC granted an international radiotelegraph service’s
application to extend its service into a competitor’s market. The FCC
cited a “national policy in favor of competition” in its decision approving
the application. But Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, found
that the FCC had misinterpreted its mandate from Congress. “That there
is a national policy favoring competition cannot be maintained today
without careful qualiﬁcation,” Justice Frankfurter wrote.98 In railroads,
for example, federal “policy has shifted from one of prohibiting restraints
on competition to one of providing relief from the rigors of competition,”
he explained. In telecommunications, as in railroads, federal lawmakers
did not trust in “competition as the regulating mechanism.” Nor was
competition desirable when “considerations severely limit the number
of separate enterprises that can efﬁciently, or conveniently, exist.”99
The FCC, therefore, could not grant a certiﬁcate of convenience and
necessity based on the presumed, but unproven, beneﬁts of increasing
competition.100 The Court remanded the case.
The Decline of Anti-Competition Regulation at the Federal Level
Although “public convenience and necessity” entry restrictions
gradually disappeared at the federal level in the 1970s and 1980s, legal
challenges in the courts did not hasten their demise. Rather, their disap-
pearance tracked changing ideas about the proper role of the state and
competition in themarketplace, which ushered in a larger legal paradigm
shift.101 Although many forces converged to encourage this
95Gaffney, 95 A.2d at 409–10. See also Gough, 76 A.2d at 87.
96Gough, 76 A.2d at 87.
97Gaffney, 95 A.2d at 411. See also Kelleher, 119 P.2d at 309; Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. McLain, 47 N.W.2d 919, 922 (1951).
98 F.C.C. v. RCA Communications Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953).
99RCA, 346 U.S. at 92.
100RCA, 346 U.S. at 97.
101 Kearney and Merrill, “Great Transformation,” 1328.
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transformation, ideological change combined with interest-group activ-
ism accounts for its pervasiveness across industries.102 Calls for change
accelerated in the 1970s, as both liberal and conservative thinkers
decried the existing paradigm of regulation in industries such as aviation
and trucking.103 Furthermore, the oil crisis, rising inﬂation, and a mid-
decade recession all deepened public anxiety about economic issues
and created a window for change.104
Economists, most notably Alfred Kahn and George Stigler, provided
the intellectual underpinnings for the movement to roll back anti-
competition laws, while Senator Edward Kennedy worked within
Congress to make the case for regulatory reform.105 First, during the
Ford administration, Kennedy held hearings on the need for airline
regulation, which spawned an internal review by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB). A couple of years later, president Jimmy Carter then
appointed Kahn as CAB chair; Kahn proceeded to experiment with
loosening entry restrictions.106
In advocating for reform, Kahn drew on decades of economic
research that critiqued regulatory restrictions of competition. Well
before Kahn’s appointment, in the late 1930s, economists had revised
their thinking about “ruinous competition,” which came to be under-
stood as a problem limited to markets with undifferentiated products.107
“Passenger air transportation,” Kahn explained in 1970, “does not have
the economic attributes of an industry prone to destructive competition.”
Moreover, he argued, “freer competition” would provide “enormous
potential beneﬁts” to the consuming public.108 This analysis resonated
with the ascendant Chicago School of economics and conservative
critics of the regulatory state, as well as with consumer advocacy
groups. The existing airlines and their employees were the major oppo-
nents of deregulation.109
102Kearney and Merrill, 1329.
103 Kearney and Merrill, 1325.
104 Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis
D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, MA, 1984), 259.
105 Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, 2 vols.
(New York, 1970); George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 2, no. 1 (1971): 3–21; McCraw, Prophets of Regulation;
Richard H. K. Vietor, “Contrived Competition: Airline Regulation and Deregulation, 1925–
1988,” Business History Review 64, no. 1 (1990): 81.
106 Vietor, “Contrived Competition,” 82–83.
107Hovenkamp, “United States Competition Policy,” 320, 326–30, 341–43.
108Kahn, Economics of Regulation, 2:220.
109McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 263, 269. On the politics of deregulation more gener-
ally, see Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, DC,
1985); and Shane Hamilton, “The Populist Appeal of Deregulation: Independent Truckers
and the Politics of Free Enterprise, 1935–1980,” Enterprise & Society 10, no. 1 (2009): 137–77.
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After Kahn’s experiments at the CAB, Congress began removing cer-
tiﬁcate of convenience requirements. It started with the passage of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.110 Prior to Kahn’s tenure, the CAB
and other federal agencies in charge of issuing certiﬁcates had curtailed
the entry of new providers in regulated markets. In the airline industry,
for example, the CAB denied all seventy-nine applications for new
domestic airlines that were ﬁled between 1950 and 1974.111 But with
passage of the 1978 act, domestic airline applicants no longer had to
prove convenience and necessity; they were presumed. CAB could
deny an application only if it found that the presumptionwas rebutted.112
The process continued into the 1980s and 1990s. Congress lowered
regulatory barriers to entry for interstate truckers in 1980, before elim-
inating “convenience and necessity” review entirely in 1995.113 Also in
1995, Congress lowered barriers to entry for railroads and granted the
ICC authority to exempt railroads from existing regulatory require-
ments, including certiﬁcates.114 For telecommunications, the certiﬁcate
requirement remained on the books awhile longer, but in 1996, Congress
exempted line extensions and cable television providers entirely from
the certiﬁcate requirement and authorized the FCC to “forbear” from
enforcing it for other providers.115 Three years later, pursuant to this
authority, the FCC adopted a rule that conferred blanket authorization
for the construction of new domestic communications lines.116
In banking, the demise of entry restrictions came about largely
through administrative action, with some legislative encouragement.
Through the 1960s, federal regulators had frequently cited “insufﬁcient
need” as the basis for denials of new bank charters.117 The Federal
Reserve had likewise refused to allow mergers involving bank holding
companies on this basis, policing against the dangers of overbanking
or excessive competition. But the tide began to shift when Congress
amended the BankMerger Act in 1966, whichmade clear the importance
of preserving competition within the banking industry and allowed anti-
competitive mergers to proceed only upon proof of a countervailing
110Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
111 Kearney and Merrill, “Great Transformation,” 1350n117.
112 Congress also adopted the Natural Gas Policy Act in 1978. Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat 3350.
113Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793; ICC Termination Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
114 ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
115 Joseph D. Kearney, “Will the FCC Go theWay of the ICC?,”University of Colorado Law
Review 71 (2000): 1171n84; Section 214 Deregulated Entry Requirements and Streamlined
Exit Requirements for Domestic Telecommunications Common Carriers, 64 Fed. Reg.
39938-01 (23 July 1999).
116 Section 214 Deregulated Entry Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 39938-01.
117 Fischel, Rosenﬁeld, and Stillman, “Regulation of Banks,” 331n85.
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beneﬁt to meeting the “needs” of the community.118 The act’s express
language, afﬁrming the value of competition, suggested that a reduction
in competition was not in itself a countervailing public beneﬁt.
The following decade, Congress further muddled the meaning of the
“convenience and needs” of the community with its passage of the 1977
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which imposed obligations on
banks to lend in their communities.119 The Federal Reserve then began
to equate “convenience and needs” with fulﬁllment of a bank’s fair-
lending obligations under the CRA.120 And the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller
of the Currency also announced that it would no longer seek to “protect
existing competitors from the competition a new bank will provide” as
part of its charter application review.121 In the 1980s, the Justice Depart-
ment likewise adopted a more permissive approach to its review of bank
mergers, lessening the chance that a merger would be deemed anti-
competitive so as to require ofﬁcial consideration of a countervailing
beneﬁt to the “convenience and needs” of the community.122 The “conve-
nience and needs of the community” requirement remained on the books
for some limited purposes, but the language proved sufﬁciently vague to
allow regulators enormous discretion in its interpretation.123
State Anti-Competition Laws Linger
Like the federal government, the states also began removing certiﬁ-
cate requirements in the last decades of the twentieth century. However,
they proceeded in a halting, piecemeal fashion that left numerous entry
restrictions in place. In the late 1970s, when the federal rollback began,
many states still required certiﬁcates for businesses to enter most so-
called public-service enterprises: those engaged in the provision of
118 Act of Feb. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7. See also Act of July 1, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (similar standard for banking holding company mergers).
119Warren L. Dennis, “The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: Deﬁning Convenience
and Needs of the Community,” Banking Law Journal 95 (1978): 693–717.
120Mehrsa Baradaran, “Banking and the Social Contract,” Notre Dame Law Review 89
(2014): 1339–40.
121 Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Charter Policy, 45 Fed. Reg.
68605 (15 Oct. 1980). In 1991, Congress ofﬁcially removed the requirement. Ricks, “Money
as Infrastructure,” 820.
122 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,” Illinois Law Review 2002,
no. 2 (2002): 250. On recent mergers, see Mitria Wilson, “Protecting the Public’s Interests:
A Consumer-Focused Reassessment of the Standard for Bank Mergers and Acquisitions,”
Banking Law Journal 130 (2013): 350–78. See also Depository Institutions Deregulation
andMonetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (lifting restrictions on inter-
est paid on demand deposits).
123 12 U.S.C. 1816 (FDIC); 12 U.S.C. 1842 (Bank Holding Companies); Michael P. Malloy,
Banking Law and Regulation, 2nd ed. (2014, 2019 supp.), § 2.02.
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transportation (e.g., railroads, street railroads, motor carriers), commu-
nications (e.g., telephone, telegraph, cable television), and gas, electric,
and water supply.124 They also limited the ability of small-sum lenders
and banks to form and grow by requiring proof that a new ofﬁce would
serve the convenience and needs of the community.125 States further
expanded their certiﬁcate requirements in the 1960s and 1970s to limit
the construction of new healthcare facilities based on “community
need,” partially in response to federal urging.126
The lowering and removal of barriers to entry at the state level was
most sweeping in the banking arena, perhaps because banks dissatisﬁed
with their home state chartering rules could easily avoid them by pursu-
ing a federal charter or a charter in a different state.127 This competition
among jurisdictions created pressure on states to make their chartering
rules less onerous in order to encourage ﬁnancial institutions to locate
within their borders.128 States generally kept the “convenience and
needs” standards for new bank charters and banks, but many reinter-
preted the meaning of this standard to lower the barrier to entry.129 In
addition, barriers to interstate bank branching gradually eroded over
the 1980s.130 Congress then adopted the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994,
which removed the remaining federal barriers to interstate branching
and encouraged states to allow out-of-state banks to open branches in
their jurisdictions.131
On the other hand, for industries that were unlikely to move across
state lines or seek a federal charter, many states retained certiﬁcate
requirements. As economists and legal scholars have repeatedly
observed, these rules beneﬁt entrenched service providers, who have
124 Jones, “Origins,” 427–28.
125 “Bank Charter,” 514. For branching standards as of 1985, see Cynthia Young Reisz, “The
Future of Shared Automatic Teller Networks in the Wake ofMarine Midland Bank: A Call for
Federal Legislation,” Vanderbilt Law Review 38 (1985): 1627. New York eliminated conve-
nience and advantage from its branching rules in 1981. New York Laws of 1981, c. 411, § 1;
New York Banking Law s. 24, 29 (2018).
126 Lauretta HigginsWolfson, “State Regulation of Health Facility Planning: The Economic
Theory and Political Realities of Certiﬁcates of Need,” DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 4,
no. 2 (2001): 266.
127 Frank H. Easterbrook, “Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism,” Journal of Law &
Economics 26 (1983): 34–35.
128On competition between the states leading to rollback of regulations on ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, see Fleming, City of Debtors, 229–31.
129 See Dep’t of Fin. Institutions v. Wayne Bank & Tr. Co., 385 N.E.2d 482, 484 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978); and First Nat. Bank of Worland v. Fin. Institutions Bd., 616 P.2d 787, 798
(Wyo. 1980).
130 Christian A. Johnson and Tara Rice, “Assessing a Decade of Interstate Bank Branching,”
Washington and Lee Law Review 65 (2008): 84–85.
131 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 2338. States could opt out of Riegle-Neal, but fewer than a dozen did.
Johnson and Rice, “Assessing a Decade,” 87.
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an interest in lobbying to retain protections from more intense competi-
tion.132 Recently, a couple of states removed their certiﬁcate restrictions
for intrastate household movers, in response to litigation by libertarian
public-interest groups attacking state licensing rules and certiﬁcate
requirements on constitutional grounds.133 But, under a rational-basis
standard of review, these requirements generally have withstood judicial
scrutiny.134 The majority of states likewise still have some “certiﬁcate of
need” requirement for new healthcare-facility construction.135
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C), a model state
law that would have signiﬁcantly increased competition in the small-sum
lending arena, similarly failed to receive widespread adoption in the
states. The U3C, ﬁrst promulgated in 1968 and revised in 1974, would
have eliminated “convenience and advantage” licensing requirements.136
But, as one commentator noted, the “vested interests” in the industry did
not like this aspect of the law.137 Most states accordingly failed to adopt
the law and instead retained their existing small loan laws. New Mexico,
for example, still includes a convenience and advantage requirement in
its small-sum lending regulations.138
Conclusion
This history, tracing the ﬂow and ebb of rules requiring certiﬁcates of
public convenience and necessity to enter certain industries, yields two
insights for historians of business and scholars of economic policy.
First, by following a single regulatory technique across several industries
and through time, it shows the “kinship” between past approaches to
132 For example, Stigler, “Theory of Economic Regulation.”
133 Sandefur, “State Competitor’s Veto Laws,” 1045–46; Timothy Sandefur, “A Public Con-
venience and Necessity and Other Conspiracies against Trade: A Case Study from theMissouri
Moving Industry,”GeorgeMasonUniversity Civil Rights Law Journal 24 (2014): 185; Bruner
v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2014); Munie v. Koster, 4:10CV01096AGF (E.D.Mo.)
(dismissed 12 July 2012 as moot).
134 Sandefur, “Public Convenience andNecessity,” 99–100. But seeBruner, 997 F. Supp. 2d
at 691. See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (shielding ﬁrms acting pursuant to a state
anti-competition law from federal antitrust enforcement).
135 “Certiﬁcate of Need State Laws,” National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
website, accessed 23 Jan. 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certiﬁcate-of-
need-state-laws.aspx.
136 See also National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United
States (Washington, DC, 1972), 138.
137William L. Sartoris, “The Convenience and Advantage Clause in Small-Loan Legislation:
Pro and Con,” Business Lawyer 27, no. 1 (1971): 349. For a defense of the convenience and
advantage requirement, see J. Barry Harper, “The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and
Freedom of Entry,” Business Lawyer 24, no. 1 (1968): 227–35.
138Only eleven states ultimately adopted some version of the U3C. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-15-
5 (West 2018).
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regulation of infrastructure and ﬁnancial institutions.139 Although truck-
ing companies and small-sum lenders may seem to contemporary
observers to have little in common, lawmakers once understood the
two industries as suffering from the same tendencies toward ruinous
competition, which necessitated similar regulatory restraints. In both
contexts, lawmakers aimed to curb competition not to rein in big busi-
ness but to discourage unsound business practices that could harm the
public or cause companies to collapse. Further comparative study of
the regulation of ﬁnance and infrastructure over time may yield addi-
tional evidence of policy echoes between the two.
Second, by looking at the history of capitalism within federalism,
this history illustrates the importance of incorporating states into
stories about economic regulation in the twentieth century.140 At
minimum, it offers a more nuanced periodization of shifts in American
competition policymaking. When viewed from the federal level, this
story of anti-competition regulation follows a familiar pattern: the tide
of regulation ﬂowed in with the New Deal and receded during the
Carter and Reagan administrations. But the story looks different when
it includes developments in the states. From this vantage point, the nar-
rative begins earlier, in the late nineteenth century, when states began
experimenting with regulatory techniques that Congress later copied
into federal law.141 Also, the end point of the story is later and less well
deﬁned: many states have retained their anti-competition rules for
some industries even as the tide quickly turned against legal restraints
on competition at the federal level in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Beyond illustrating the strange and syncopated rhythms of policy-
making in a federalist system, this periodization also suggests different
political dynamics at play at each level of government. The states and
federal government, beginning at different moments, both eventually
imposed certiﬁcate requirements on a variety of industries, backed by
then-prevalent economic ideas about competition and, sometimes, by
the support of entrenched ﬁrms. Shortly thereafter, however, the eco-
nomic consensus shifted to favor eliminating such restrictions in most
industries. But it was only at the federal level that these new ideas,
coupled with the support of other interest groups, led to the widespread
rollback of certiﬁcate laws beginning in the 1970s. At the state level,
139 Ricks, “Money as Infrastructure,” 767.
140On the importance of studying the role of the states, see William R. Childs, “State Reg-
ulators and Pragmatic Federalism in the United States, 1889–1945,” Business History Review
75, no. 4 (2001): 701–38; and Harry N. Scheiber, “State Law and ‘Industrial Policy’ in Amer-
ican Development, 1790–1987,” California Law Review 75, no. 1 (1987): 415–44.
141On this dynamic in consumer credit regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, see Fleming,City
of Debtors, 217–18.
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rollback occurred when the regulated ﬁrms could easily move across
state lines, spurring regulatory competition between the states to lower
legal barriers to entry. But state certiﬁcate rules have persisted in
other corners of the economy. This suggests that the power of entrenched
business interests to retain anti-competitive regulation varies signiﬁ-
cantly across political contexts; it is heightened when governance
occurs at the state and local level and in the absence of regulatory com-
petition between jurisdictions.
. . .
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